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in Safeguarding against Psychiatric Abuse
Abstract:
This article explores the role of an international open society of mental health stakeholders in raising awareness 
of values and thereby reducing the vulnerability of psychiatry to abuse. There is evidence that hidden values 
play a key role in rendering psychiatry vulnerable to being used abusively for purposes of social or political 
control. Recent work in values-based practice aimed at raising awareness of values between people of different 
ethnic origins has shown the importance of what we call “values auto-blindness” – a lack of awareness of one’s 
own values as a key part of our background “life-world” – in driving differential rates of involuntary psychiatric 
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treatment between ethnic groups. It is argued that the vulnerability of psychiatry to abuse stems from values 
auto-blindness operating on the judgments of rationality implicit in psychiatric diagnostic concepts. Acting 
like a “hall of mirrors,” an international open society of mental health stakeholders would counter the effects 
of values auto-blindness through enhanced mutual understanding of the values embedded in our respective 
life-worlds across and between the diverse perspectives of its constituents. The article concludes by noting that 
a model for the required open society is available in the contemporary interdisciplinary field of philosophy 
and psychiatry.
Keywords: 
abuse of psychiatry, values-based practice, life-world, values auto-blindness, person-centered care, recovery, 
Austin, Hare, Fanon, Murdoch
Introduction 
Psychiatry is notoriously vulnerable to being used abusively for purposes of social or political control rather 
than for the purposes proper to a clinical discipline. Such abuses became widespread, for example, in the 1960s 
and 1970s in the former Soviet Union.1 We return below to this period. But it is far from unique. Similar abuses 
have occurred in many other parts of the world and at different historical periods.2
Nor is contemporary psychiatry immune. As recently as 1999, for example, the UK government launched 
a major review of the UK’s Mental Health Act3 on a “public safety” ticket.4 The resultant legislation, moreover, 
has been and continues to be used disproportionately with particular groups, notably with young black men.5 
Again, we return to this issue below. But evidence of a possible connection between the disproportionate use 
of involuntary treatment in young black men and political abuses of psychiatry is provided by epidemiological 
studies suggesting that rates of involuntary treatment in the UK follow administrative boundaries.6
Whether or not any given use of psychiatry is abusive may be a matter of debate. But the vulnerability of 
the field as a whole to abuse can hardly be doubted. So this raises the question, “why?” Why should it be that 
psychiatry among other medical disciplines is so peculiarly vulnerable to abuse? 
One answer to this question, the answer that as we describe further below represents the majority view, 
is that the vulnerability of psychiatry to abuse arises from (what is perceived to be) its inadequate science base 
compared with other medical disciplines. In this article we offer a different answer. We argue that the vulner-
ability of psychiatry to abuse has more to do with its values base than with its science base. To be clear, ours 
is not a contrarian view. Our view, as will be seen, is that science remains crucially important to best practice 
in psychiatry. The vulnerability of psychiatry to abuse arises, however, not from inadequate science but from 
a failure of awareness of and engagement with the values that (as a key element of our background life-worlds) 
determine how psychiatric science is translated into practice. Gaining insight into our own values, we further 
argue, requires a relational (rather than individualistic) process. It is in supporting a relational process of this 
1) Bloch and Reddaway, Russia’s Political Hospitals.
2) van Voren and Keukens, Political Abuse of Psychiatry. 
3) Legislation enabling involuntary psychiatric hospitalisation and/or treatment in the UK.
4) Straw, Central Office of Information (COI), 221, 19.7.1999; Mullen, “Dangerous People with Severe Personality Disorder.”
5) Care Quality Commission, Count Me In 2010; NHS Digital, 2018
6) Weich et al., “Variation in Compulsory Psychiatric Inpatient Admission in England.”
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kind that an international open society of mental health stakeholders could help to reduce the vulnerability 
of psychiatry to abuse.
The article is in four main sections. Section 1, The Evidence, reviews the findings from a study of 
Soviet psychiatry pointing to the role of values in driving its period of political abuse. Section 2, The Theory, 
argues that the vulnerability of psychiatry to abuse derives from the particularly diverse nature of the values 
operative in the areas of human experience and behavior with which psychiatry is characteristically engaged. 
This diversity of values plays out in the form of hidden values driving the judgments of rationality implicit 
in psychiatric diagnostic concepts. Section 3, Values Auto-blindness, explains why the values driving abuse 
remain hidden and, hence, why psychiatry remains vulnerable to abuse. Section 4, The Hall of Mirrors, gener-
alizes the argument of Section 3 to the need for an international open society of mental health stakeholders 
to counter the effects of values auto-blindness and thus reduce psychiatry’s vulnerability to abuse. The article 
concludes by pointing to the rapidly expanding interdisciplinary field of philosophy and psychiatry as a model 
for the required open society. 
Section 1, The Evidence 
Early indications of the potential importance of hidden or otherwise unacknowledged values underlying the 
vulnerability of psychiatry to abuse came from a study of the scientific publications from Soviet psychiatry 
during the 1960s and 1970s, the period at which as noted above, political abuses of psychiatry became wide-
spread in the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).7
The opportunity for the study came when, after the collapse of the USSR, a young Russian psychiatrist, 
Alex Smirnoff, visited Oxford for a year of work experience in the University Department of Psychiatry. One 
of us (K.W.M. Fulford) worked on the study with Alex and with a bilingual social work colleague, Elena Snow. 
Drawing on ordinary language philosophy as practiced notably by the Oxford philosopher, J.L. Austin,8 we 
explored Soviet concepts of mental disorder by comparing Russian and “Western” psychiatric science publica-
tions during the period in question. Austin called approaches of this kind “philosophical field work” because 
they involve exploring the meanings of concepts not by reflection but by examining the ways they are actually 
used in everyday (or ordinary) contexts.9
Guided by contemporary views of Soviet psychiatric abuse in Britain and North America, our expecta-
tion was that we would find Soviet concepts of mental disorder to be lacking in scientific rigor. Quite to the 
contrary however, we found that the science of Soviet psychiatry was conceptually identical with its contempo-
rary Western counterparts. Its “delusions of reformism,” in particular, were structurally identical with Western 
mono-symptomatic political delusions; and its diagnostic concept of “sluggish schizophrenia” was structurally 
identical with the Western “latent schizophrenia.” Not only that but Soviet psychiatry shared with Western 
psychiatry an underlying brain-based disease model of schizophrenia (derived in the Soviet case from the work 
of the pathologist, IV Davidovsky).
Our conclusion therefore was that the vulnerability, at least of Soviet psychiatry to abuse, could not 
stem from any essential deficiency in its scientific model compared with prevailing models in use in Western 
psychiatry. This was of course not as such direct proof that Soviet psychiatric abuse was values-based. But it 
7) Fulford, Smirnoff and Snow, “Concepts of Disease and the Abuse of Psychiatry in the USSR.”
8) For an authoritative introduction to Austin’s ordinary language philosophy see chapter 1 of the biography J.L. Austin by one his 
pupils, the philosopher G.J. Warnock. Warnock, J. L. Austin.
9) Austin, “A Plea for Excuses,” 25.
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left this possibility open. And we speculated in our paper that unacknowledged Soviet political norms were at 
the heart of the vulnerability of Soviet psychiatry to abuse. In the case of delusions of reformism, for example, 
Soviet political norms might suggest that people who believed the Soviet system was in need of reform “must…” 
(to put it bluntly) “…be mad.” Other factors, we argued, administrative, professional and so forth, could be 
important in Soviet abuses becoming widespread and institutionalized. But it was in Soviet political norms, 
we argued, and in their role in driving diagnostic judgments of rationality, that the essential vulnerability of 
Soviet psychiatry to abuse was to be found.
So far as we are aware comparable ordinary language studies have not been carried out in other parts 
of the world where political abuses of psychiatry have become widespread. But growing recognition of the 
importance of values in psychiatric diagnosis supports the possibility that similar processes may be in play. The 
North American psychiatrist and philosopher, John Sadler, for example, has used an ordinary language meth-
odology to identify the breadth and diversity of values in the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual10 (or DSM);11 and one of us (Anna Bergqvist) has examined the role of values in shared 
decision-making in mental health practice.12 There is thus a prima facie connection here. In the next section 
we look at two main theories of how the connection operates.
Section 2, The Theory 
One widely endorsed theory of the prominence of values in psychiatric diagnosis is that it reflects some (supposed) 
inadequacy in psychiatric science. This is the line taken, for example, albeit in different ways, by many on both 
sides of the long-running debate about the validity of the concept of mental illness.13 Such views are consistent 
with the widespread perception of the twentieth century medicine that psychiatry is underdeveloped scien-
tifically compared with other specialties. It was this view, combined with an adverse Western view of Soviet 
psychiatric science, that led to the expectation of inadequate science in the above study of Soviet concepts of 
mental disorder.
The theory that we adopt in this article, consistently with our overall line on psychiatric abuse, is not 
science-based but values-based. To anticipate, the bottom line of this theory is that the prominence of psychi-
atric diagnostic values reflects the diversity of human values operative in the areas of experience and behavior 
with which psychiatry is characteristically concerned. We do not have space to explore the arguments for and 
against this values-based theory in detail.14 Given however its importance in relation to our subsequent argu-
ments about values auto-blindness and the need for a “hall of mirrors,” it will be worth considering it a little 
further before coming to its implications for the vulnerability of psychiatry to abuse.
Our values-based theory is derived from the work of another Oxford philosopher, R.M. Hare. Following 
Austin,15 Hare worked on the ordinary language philosophy of values.16 One of us (K.W.M. Fulford), in his 
10) American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.
11) See Sadler, Values and Psychiatric Diagnosis.
12) Bergqvist, “Narrative Understanding, Value, and Diagnosis.”
13) See for example, respectively: Szasz, “The Myth of Mental Illness,” 113–118, arguing against the concept; and: Kendell, “The 
Concept of Disease and Its Implications for Psychiatry,” arguing for it.
14) See Fulford, Moral Theory and Medical Practice, and for an update on the evidence and arguments in question, Fulford and van 
Staden, “Values-based Practice,” 385–412. 
15) Austin and Hare were both White’s Professors of Moral Philosophy in Oxford.
16) Hare, The Language of Morals; and “Descriptivism,” 115–134.
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turn, applied Hare’s work on the language of values to the language of medicine,17 thus deriving the theoretical 
basis for what was to emerge a few years later as values-based practice (see below).
Among other important observations about the language of values, Hare pointed out that although 
values are ubiquitously present and important, we tend to notice them only when they cause trouble and hence 
come to our attention. Values are in this respect like the air we breathe – this, too, is ubiquitously present and 
important but noticed only when it causes trouble. Air causes trouble when we get short of it. Values, Hare 
pointed out, cause trouble when they are diverse and hence come into conflict. Visible values then, on Hare’s 
account, equal diverse values.
One of Hare’s examples of “visible values = diverse values” involved comparing fruits like strawberries 
(where our values are similar) with pictures (where our values are widely diverse). Now, even with strawberries 
we may have different preferences. But for most people a strawberry that is, say, red, sweet and grub-free, is 
a good strawberry. With pictures on the other hand we do not have even this degree of agreement. The result, 
Hare pointed out, is that whereas the expression “good picture” is overtly evaluative, the corresponding expres-
sion “good strawberry” carries mainly descriptive meaning: it is taken to mean that the strawberry in question 
is (consistently with the widely adopted norms for a good strawberry noted above) red, sweet and grub-free. 
“Good strawberry” according to this view is, no less than “good picture,” an evaluative expression. But the 
evaluative meaning of “good picture” is explicit while that of “good strawberry” is hidden by its descriptive 
meaning and hence remains largely implicit.
In offering examples of this kind Hare clearly did not have medicine in mind. But his observations 
neatly explain the prominence of values in psychiatric diagnostic concepts. We can see this by simply mapping 
Hare’s “good strawberry” versus “good picture” example onto a contrast sometimes drawn between “bodily 
illness” and “mental illness.” Thus, where “bodily illness” is like “good strawberry” in that both carry mainly 
descriptive meaning, “mental illness” is like “good picture” in that both carry overtly evaluative meaning. 
Hare’s observation suggests that this reflects the relative diversity of human values in the areas with which 
bodily illness and mental illness are respectively concerned. Thus, consistently with Hare’s observation, bodily 
illness is concerned with areas of human experience and behavior (such as pain, loss of mobility, and threat 
of death) in which (as with “good strawberry”) our values are largely shared. But mental illness on the other 
hand is concerned with areas of human experience and behavior (such as emotion, desire, belief, volition and 
sexuality) where our values (as with “good picture”) are highly diverse. For this reason alone, then, Hare’s 
observation suggests, for reason solely of the relative diversity of human values in the areas of human experi-
ence and behavior with which mental illness is characteristically concerned, values will be more explicit in 
psychiatric diagnostic concepts than in their bodily medicine counterparts.
Again, we do not have space to acknowledge, let alone do justice to, the many theoretical issues raised 
by the strategy of applying Hare’s observations on the language of values to the language of medicine.18 The 
strategy is, however, at least partly justified by its outputs in the development of values-based practice not only 
in mental health but increasingly in all areas of health care.19 So derived, values-based practice is essentially 
17) Fulford, Moral Theory and Medical Practice.
18) We stress that R.M. Hare’s wider theoretical commitment to a fact-value dualism plays no part in values-based practice; in this 
respect values-based practice is closer to the position of the American philosopher; Hilary Putnam presented, for example, in The 
Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and other Essays.
19) Fulford, Peile and Carroll, Essential Values-based Practice.
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a partner to evidence-based practice.20 This is why, as we indicated earlier, ours is not a contrarian account. 
Our values-based account of the visibility of values in psychiatric diagnosis leaves the challenges of psychi-
atric science fully in place. But it adds to these scientific challenges a whole series of further challenges arising 
from the diversity of the values operative in the areas with which psychiatry is characteristically concerned. It 
was in response to these further challenges that as described elsewhere values-based practice developed first 
in mental health.21 Recent case studies, furthermore, in cross cultural values-based mental health practice, are 
fully consistent with our hypothesized role of psychiatry’s diagnostic values in abuse.22
Yet fruitful as Hare’s observation has been, when it comes to explaining the vulnerability of psychiatry 
to abuse it leaves a key question unanswered – just why should the values operative in abuse remain hidden? 
After all, the values in question are in the required sense “causing trouble” (i.e., they are causing abusive uses 
of psychiatry) so by Hare’s observation they should be more not less visible. It is to this question, and to the 
role of what we will call “values auto-blindness” in answering it, that we turn next. 
Section 3, Values Auto-blindness
This section is in part autobiographical in that its key messages about values auto-blindness were born from 
a project on which two of us (Colin King and K.W.M. Fulford) have worked together over a number of years. 
The project in question sought to apply the principles of values-based practice to explaining and intervening 
in the disproportionate use of involuntary psychiatric treatment in young black men. As noted above (in our 
introduction) this has been a long-standing concern in the UK and elsewhere. It has been variously explained 
but there are grounds (including epidemiological grounds) for believing that it might represent at least in part 
yet another example of psychiatric abuse.
In applying a values-based approach to this issue our project was guided by the values-based interpretation 
of psychiatric abuse outlined in Sections 1 and 2 above. This made it unique in a number of ways. First, reflecting 
the premise of values-based practice in mutual respect, our guiding principle was (in Colin King’s phrase) to 
work “across the color line,” avoiding the “victim/victimizer” polarization of much contemporary work on race 
and mental health. Second, working within this principle our methods, again following values-based precedents, 
were co-productive: we brought together our very different backgrounds and expertise with an equality of voice. 
20) Fulford, “Values and Values-based Practice.”; Bergqvist, “Narrative Understanding, Value and Diagnosis.” The partnership runs 
deep in that evidence and values are closely intertwined in practice. In Bergqvist, for example, one of us (Anna Bergqvist) applies 
her particularist account of valuation to show that in shared decision-making it would be a mistake to construe the idea of “expert 
opinion” as the provision of medical information from a clinical stance that is “objective” in the sense that it is not viewed through 
the lens of the clinician’s own implicit background value commitments. This of course raises the further question of the origins of the 
values implicit in medical practice. This further question is important if as we argue in this paper the vulnerability of psychiatry to 
abuse arises from a failure of awareness of implicit background values and of their influence on the judgements of rationality inherent 
in psychiatric diagnosis. But we must leave this further question aside for now.
21) Fulford, Peile and Carroll, Essential Values-based Practice.
22) Mitrev and Mantarkov, “Non-Traditional Religion, Hyper-religiosity and Psychopathology.” In the story presented in this chapter, 
the differential diagnosis between (pathological) delusional and (normal) spiritual beliefs turns directly on cultural and other values 
implicit in DSM’s Criterion B for schizophrenia. Criterion B requires that the patient’s “level of functioning in one or more major 
areas, such as work, interpersonal relations, or self-care, is markedly below the level (previously) achieved” American Psychiatric 
Association, Diagnostics and Statistics Manual, 99. The authors of this chapter show the extent to which value judgements – reflecting 
in part but importantly cultural values – are necessary to determining whether the changes in functioning shown by their patient were 
above or (as required by Criterion B) below the level previously achieved. This and other case studies in Stoyanov et al., International 
Perspectives in Values-based Mental Health Practice; illustrate the extent to which cultural and other values influence all areas of 
mental health care.
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Third as to outputs our aim, consistently with the core aim of values-based practice, was to raise awareness of 
the values putatively driving the disproportionate use of involuntary treatment with young black men.
It was in raising awareness of values, however, that right from the start we found ourselves struggling. 
There was evidence that in the UK the use of involuntary treatment was being driven predominantly by values 
of risk aversion.23 The hypothesis thus suggested by one of us, K.W.M. Fulford, who is white (and trained in 
psychiatry), was that young black men might be perceived by service providers as being more at risk than young 
white men. Colin King however, who is black, argued to the contrary that while it might well be true that young 
black men were perceived by service providers as being more at risk, the underlying values driving their percep-
tions of risk (and hence the disproportionate use of involuntary treatment in this group) were of “whiteness.” 
Our project, Colin King suggested, was thus looking the wrong way. Rather than asking “why are young black 
men more likely than their white counterparts to be subject to involuntary psychiatric treatment?,” we should 
be asking “why are white (or white-trained) psychiatrists more likely to treat young black men than their white 
counterparts on an involuntary basis?”
K.W.M. Fulford recognized that this suggestion was well founded. He knew that in making it, Colin 
King was drawing on a long tradition of philosophical and other academic work by black writers such as the 
North American sociologist and social historian W.E.B. Du Bois24 and the French West Indian philosopher and 
psychiatrist Frantz Fanon,25 viewed through the lens of Colin King’s personal experience both as a patient and 
as a mental health professional.26 Fanon’s work, moreover, being in part linguistic in inspiration, was closely 
allied to the ordinary language philosophy on which K.W.M. Fulford had drawn in developing values-based 
practice. Yet for all this it took over ten years working together for (the white) K.W.M. Fulford to gain anything 
close to insight into what (the black) Colin King meant by “whiteness.” 
We have described how this came about in detail elsewhere.27 But in essence it was only when Colin King, 
K.W.M. Fulford and others subsequently involved in the project28 came to write up their personal perspectives on 
working together, that what Colin King meant by whiteness, and how this might impact mental health, became 
fully apparent to K.W.M. Fulford. Language again played a key role here. The point was made in this instance 
by another member of the now expanded project, Steven Gillard, who is a white mental health researcher. In his 
personal perspective Steven pointed out that his (and others’) research on race and mental health was invari-
ably written up in the form of third personal commentaries on the first personal experiences of their “research 
subjects.” This, Steven said, had the effect of objectifying the black experience while at the same time hiding 
from the researchers the values (including the values of whiteness) they brought to their work. 
This made sense to (the ordinary-language-philosophy-trained) K.W.M. Fulford. Even so, the insight he 
gained was only partial. As he described in his own contribution to the book, he remained perplexed by the 
concept of whiteness, the moreso indeed because of the dissonance he now experienced between intellectual 
recognition of its likely significance and his lack of any real emotional understanding. He (K.W.M. Fulford) 
felt rather as he imagined a color-blind person might feel, recognizing the significance of (say) a red traffic light 
23) See for example, Royal College of Psychiatrists, Rethinking risk to others in mental health services; and Care Quality Commission, 
Monitoring the Mental Health Act in 2010/11.
24) Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk.
25) Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks.
26) King, “They Diagnosed Me a Schizophrenic When I Was Just a Gemini.”
27) King et al., “They Diagnosed Me a Schizophrenic When I Was Just a Gemini.”
28) The project had by now developed into a Network hosted by the Collaborating Centre for Values-based Practice in Oxford – see 
valuesbasedpractice.org/what do we do/networks and click on Whiteness and Race Equality Network
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without actually being able to “see” redness. 
In the event emotional understanding required a further intervention from Colin King. Here is how this 
came about. The write ups of our personal perspectives on working together were the basis for a joint contri-
bution to a book on cultural values and mental health.29 The book was developed as a co-writing project that 
involved drafts of its introductory and concluding chapters being circulated to all contributors for comment. As 
one of the editors, K.W.M. Fulford was responsible for drafting and circulating these materials. Most contribu-
tors had only minor or no comments. Colin King, however, pointed out that that despite the understanding 
provided by Steven Gillard’s observations, the standard “research” use of personal pronouns was still in play. 
As an editor, K.W.M. Fulford was “speaking in the third person…” but commenting “on first person accounts of 
the black and white cultural challenges…” with the result that “your cultural values [as editors] are absent.” It 
was through this comment, and thanks to a subsequent conversation, that I (K.W.M. Fulford) finally began to 
really see how my own values of whiteness had influenced and were continuing to influence our work together 
on the project. 
This story illustrates just how persistent and deeply ingrained values auto-blindness may be (K.W.M. 
Fulford’s values auto-blindness in this case). But it also shows how it may be overcome. It shows that it is 
possible to gain not only theoretical insight into it but also emotional understanding of one’s own values by 
way of open-ended dialogue between people with very different perspectives. This is not unprecedented. It is 
indeed consistent with ideas about the nature of moral or evaluative understanding worked out by yet another 
Oxford philosopher, Iris Murdoch, and developed by one of us (Anna Bergqvist) in her concept of evaluative 
perception as being essentially relational in character. It is to this work and its implications for generalizing 
our learning from the above experience to the challenge of reducing the vulnerability of psychiatry to abuse 
that we turn in the final part of this paper. 
Section 4, The Hall of Mirrors
Iris Murdoch’s notion of moral vision is standardly represented among philosophers as a criticism of modern 
moral philosophy’s lack of attention to the role of “inner” moral activity in life. While this story is well known 
within academic moral philosophy, there is another dimension to her emphasis on the struggle to see for which 
one of us (Anna Bergqvist) has argued elsewhere30 that is more directly relevant to understanding Colin King/
K.W.M. Fulford’s experience of values auto-blindness, namely the reminder that unless one acknowledges, 
precisely, the relational social dimension of the “inner life” in self-examination, there is limited scope for recog-
nizing one’s own values and hence for meeting with the other in a genuine way. Thus, in her 1967 “Sovereignty 
of the Good”, Murdoch writes, 
The enemies of art and of morals … are the same: social convention and neurosis. One may fail 
to see the individual ... because we are ourselves sunk in a social whole which we allow uncritically 
to determine our reactions, or because we see each other exclusively as so determined. Or we may 
fail to see the individual because we are completely enclosed in a fantasy world of our own into 
which we try to draw things from the outside, not grasping their reality and independence, making 
29) Stoyanov et al., International Perspectives in Values-based Mental Health Practice.
30) Bergqvist, “Moral Perception and Relational Self-Cultivation”, “Companions in Love”, and “Narrative Understanding, Value and 
Diagnosis.”
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them into dream objects of our own.31 
There are a number of characteristically Murdochian uses of Freudian terms here – “neurosis,” “fantasy,” “dream 
object” – that we may or may not find helpful. But the relevance of her core point about uncritical immersion 
in one’s “social whole” to Colin King/K.W.M. Fulford’s experience of values auto-blindness is clear. We fail (as 
K.W.M. Fulford failed) to see the other individual (Colin King in this case) because we are embedded (“sunk”) 
in a “social whole” (K.W.M. Fulford’s whiteness). One of us (Anna Bergqvist) has shown how Murdoch’s concept 
of a “social whole” amounts to a “life-world” encompassing a comprehensive outlook on reality, an unruly mix 
of evaluative and non-evaluative claims in complex interaction as a whole.32 
In Colin King/K.W.M. Fulford’s situation the result of being in this way “sunk” in one’s individual 
life-world, was K.W.M. Fulford’s values auto-blindness, his persistent inability to really “see” (with emotional 
as well as merely intellectual insight) the impact on Colin King of the “social whole” life-world of whiteness. 
Transferred therefore to the context of psychiatric practice – and understood in terms of the theory of the 
vulnerability of psychiatry to abuse outlined in Sections 1 and 2 – it is easy to see how similar processes of 
values auto-blindness could lead to abuse. Thus, paraphrasing Murdoch, if in the context of psychiatric prac-
tice, “we allow [our whiteness auto-blindness] uncritically to determine our reactions…,” the result will be 
that the values by which the judgments of rationality implicit in psychiatric diagnostic concepts are (in part 
but essentially) made, will be determined by the “social whole” life-world that the psychiatrist brings to the 
clinical encounter. This, as such, may not amount to abuse. But it makes psychiatry vulnerable to abuse because 
it renders psychiatrists (like K.W.M. Fulford) unaware of the values implicit in their “social whole” life-world 
and of the extent to which these determine the diagnostic judgments on which their interventions (including 
involuntary psychiatric hospitalization and treatment) directly depend.
 So how do we overcome values auto-blindness? This is where the notion of the relational nature of evalu-
ative perception in mental health developed by one of us33 comes in. To anticipate, the relational nature of evalu-
ative perception is derived from fundamental questions raised by Murdoch’s later work about relationality and 
perspective-taking. These lead to the idea that we can come to “see” our own values (as K.W.M. Fulford came 
to understand whiteness) through open ended dialogue with someone whose life-world gives them a different 
perspective to that of their own. Metaphorically, we see our own values in the “mirror” provided by the other 
person’s perspective. This is why, extending the metaphor, the “hall of mirrors” provided by an international 
open society of mental health stakeholders could through mutual illumination of the values embedded in our 
respective life-worlds, play a role in reducing the vulnerability of psychiatry to abuse.
Thus, in Murdoch’s Existentialists and Mystics she argues along similar lines to the above, that we are partly 
obscured in vision “because the world we see already contains our values…”34 But she then develops a further 
argument to the effect that recognizing how our vision is obscured by our values (recognizing as we might put it 
31) Murdoch, Sovereignty of Good, 216. Emphasis added.
32) Bergqvist, “Moral Perception and Relational Self-Cultivation.” Murdoch, in opposition to many academic moral philosophers 
of her time, maintained that evaluative thought is ubiquitous and all-embracing. She writes, “The area of morals, and ergo of moral 
philosophy, can … be seen as conveying the whole mode of living and the quality of our relations with the world.” Murdoch, Sovereignty 
of Good, 97, 380. The evaluative content of the “social whole” lifeworld is even clearer in Murdoch’s earlier work. In her 1956 article 
“Vision and Choice in Morality,” for example, she describes her all-encompassing notion of moral vision as “a person’s total vision 
of life, as shown in their mode of speech or silence, their choice of words, their assessments of others, their conception of their own 
lives, what they think attractive or praise-worthy, what they think funny.” Murdoch, “Vision and Choice in Morality,” 39–40. 
33) Bergqvist, “Narrative Understanding, Value and Diagnosis.”
34) Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics, 200.
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our values auto-blindness) carries an obligation for continuous self-cultivation by exercising what she describes 
as an “effortful ability to see what lies before one more clearly, more justly, to consider new possibilities.”35 
One of us (Anna Bergqvist) has argued that there are two claims implicit in this further argument of 
Murdoch’s.36 It will be worth looking at these briefly as both are relevant to best practice in mental health. 
The first claim is an epistemic “no priority” claim about knowledge in intersubjective relating, such that 
neither perspective of the parties involved is prioritized over the other. This is clearly relevant to shared 
decision-making and co-production as essential elements of best practice in contemporary person-centered 
recovery-oriented mental health care.37 The second claim is a claim about the meaning of individual concepts 
as a function of the wider interpersonal systems in which they operate. It is this second claim that combined 
with Murdoch’s earlier arguments about “social convention and neurosis” which illuminates our concept of 
values auto-blindness and its relevance to psychiatric abuse. For on this view, communicating across differ-
ences in the entrenched “social whole” life-worlds operative in interpersonal encounters in an open-ended 
way, can serve as a crucial corrective to being overly committed to “the voice” of the prevailing norms and 
ways of seeing the world. 
Herein then lies the role of an international open society of mental health stakeholders. The reason for 
this is simple: within such an open society there is no single “voice” but rather a variety of voices reflecting the 
different perspectives of different “social whole” life-worlds through which, like a hall of mirrors, mutual illu-
mination of our respective values (and their influences on our judgments of rationality) becomes possible. In 
raising awareness of our own values in this way an international open society of mental health stakeholders 
would add a crucial new element to the resources of values-based mental health practice. It would add other 
elements as well.38 But it is in its role as a hall of mirrors supporting mutual exploration as a way of overcoming 
values auto-blindness that an international open society of mental health stakeholders would contribute to 
reducing psychiatry’s vulnerability to abuse.
Conclusions
In the introduction to this article we contrasted our values-based approach with the standard science-based 
understanding of psychiatric abuse. Values and science, however, as we have repeatedly emphasized, should be 
understood in this context as being essentially complementary. Values-based practice is and has always been 
conceived as a partner to evidence-based practice. This is a matter partly of theory: evaluations and descriptions 
although distinct are essentially interdependent in the ordinary language philosophy of values underpinning 
values-based practice. It is a matter also of practice: as a partner to evidence-based practice in the shared deci-
sion-making at the heart of contemporary person-centered clinical care, values-based practice (in the widely 
used mantra39) “links science with people.” 
The partnership between values-based and science-based approaches is important across the board 
in healthcare.40 But it is of particular importance in psychiatry because of the added challenges presented 
35) Ibid., 322. Our emphasis.
36) Bergqvist, “Moral Perception, Thick Concepts and Perspectivalism,” and “Companions in Love.”
37) Fulford, “The State of the Art in Philosophy and Psychiatry.”
38) Fulford, “Cultural Values and Mental Health.”; and “The State of the Art in Philosophy and Psychiatry.”
39) This is the subtitle for example of Fulford, Peile and Carroll’s introductory volume, Essential Values-based Practice.
40) For example, surgery is currently leading on a number of training and other aspects of values-based practice, Handa et al., “The 
importance of seeing things from someone else’s point of view.” For details of this and other actively developing areas of values-based 
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by the diversity of human values in the areas of human experience and behavior with which, as we have 
described, psychiatry is characteristically concerned. One result of these added challenges is the need for 
conceptual philosophical research to stand alongside empirical investigation in psychiatric science. Again, 
this is not because psychiatric science is as so many have assumed in some way underdeveloped compared 
with the sciences of other areas of medicine. It is to the contrary because psychiatric science is very much 
a science at the cutting edge.41 Psychiatric science is in this respect more like theoretical physics than, say, 
mechanical engineering.
This is why each section of this article has drawn so directly on philosophical insights: on Austin’s ordi-
nary language philosophical “field work” in the study of Soviet psychiatric science in Section 1; on R.M. Hare’s 
ordinary language philosophy of values underpinning the values-based theory of abuse presented in Section 
2; on Franz Fanon’s linguistic studies of whiteness that resulted in the recognition of values auto-blindness 
in Section 3; and on Iris Murdoch’s insights into moral perception that led in Section 4 to the role of an open 
society of mental health stakeholders as a (metaphorical) Hall of Mirrors for reducing the vulnerability of 
psychiatry to abuse. 
None of these philosophies it is important to add has been uncritically “swallowed whole” as being in any 
sense the voice of received authority. In each case the philosophy in question has been adapted and developed 
in a dynamic two-way interaction with the constraints of practice.42 Austin’s philosophical fieldwork (Section 
1) was used in conjunction with methods of literature retrieval not available in his day.43 R.M. Hare’s (Section 
2) commitment elsewhere in his work to fact-value dualism plays no part in values-based practice (see also foot-
note 18: as we said there, values-based practice is in this respect closer to the “distinction-not-dualism” posi-
tion of the American philosopher, Hilary Putnam).44 The “working across the color line” ethos of the (Section 
3) values-based program on whiteness and race equality owes more to Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s concept of 
the “rainbow nation”45 than it does to the calls for violent resistance to which Franz Fanon came. Iris Murdoch 
(Section 4) aspired to a degree of objectivity in moral knowledge that is essentially incompatible with the reli-
ance in values-based practice on “little and local” applications of good process.46
This is no coincidence. The model adopted here – a model that replaces traditional appeals to philo-
sophical authority with critical engagement by way of dynamic two-way partnerships between philosophy 
and practice – is the model that has driven developments in the wider field of contemporary philosophy and 
psychiatry. That the model is one of partnership is perhaps one reason why contemporary philosophy and 
psychiatry has blossomed in parallel with the blossoming of contemporary cognitive and neuroscience.47 It is 
for this reason that we felt it important to emphasize earlier in this article that ours is not a contrarian model 
but one of partnership. 
The model of partnership is also, we believe, why contemporary philosophy and psychiatry has blos-
practice, see the website for the Collaborating Centre for Values-based Practice in Oxford at valuesbasedpractice.org.
41) Fulford et al., Oxford Textbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry, 240–242.
42) The work presented here is part of an on-going programme of collaboration between us from which we will be presenting further 
materials in subsequent publications.
43) It has been elsewhere integrated with contemporary norms of fieldwork in the social sciences. See Colombo et al., “Evaluating the 
Influence of Implicit Models of Mental Disorder,”; Fulford and Colombo, “Six Models of Mental Disorder,”; and King et al., Model 
Values?
44) Putnam, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and other Essays.
45) Embodied in the philosophy of Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom.
46) Fulford, “Living with Uncertainty.”
47) Fulford et al., “Past Improbable, Future Possible.”
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somed into a collegial international enterprise encompassing the many great traditions of thought and prac-
tice available in different parts of the world.48 As such, the model by its very nature prevents any one particular 
“voice of authority” becoming dominant, supporting, instead, open-ended exchanges of precisely the kind that 
we have argued is required to overcome mutual values auto-blindness. The contemporary field of philosophy 
and psychiatry thus provides a model for the international open society of mental health stakeholders that, we 
have argued, in offering a Hall of Mirrors to our respective values, could play a key role in reducing the vulner-
ability of psychiatry to abuse.
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